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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PACIFIC INDEMNITY CO.,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 870334
Priority No. 14(b)

JERRY G. BRERETON, FIRST
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A.,
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND
BONNEVILLE BANK,
Defendant and
Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Whether appellant failed to establish jurisdiction in

this Court because no notice of appeal was filed within the
time required by Rule 4(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court?
II.

Whether this Court will assume the correctness of the

lower court's judgment where, as here, appellant fails to cite
the record to support its contentions on appeal?
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III.

Whether appellant's argument improperly raises and

addresses defenses under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-419(3) and a
defense of contributory negligence for the first time on appeal?
IV.

Whether appellant is nevertheless ultimately liable as

a matter of law, based upon either statutory liability resulting from warranty of title or upon collection ratification
liability?
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-207 (1953, as amended)
Rule 4(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court
Rule 24(a)(6), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court
Rule 33(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court
Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted respondent Pacific Indemnity
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment for the reason that
appellant Bonneville Bank's ("Bonneville") collection of check
proceeds paid over forged indorsements from payor banks "did
not constitute a ratification of appellant's delivery to the
wrong person, [and] that Bonneville retained the check proceeds
collected from payor banks in trust for [Pacific Indemnity] and
[Pacific Indemnity] had a right to judgments on those funds."
(Record at 288.)
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STATEMENT OF CASE
Respondent Pacific Indemnity Company ("Pacific Indemnity")
commenced the present action against all named defendants for
recovery of losses resulting from an embezzlement scheme by
which defendant Brereton, a salesman for California-based Triad
Systems Corporation, endorsed and deposited into a personal
checking account ten customer checks totalling $66,000.00 which
were intended for his employer.

Each of the converted checks

was deposited in an account at appellant Bonneville Bank under
the name "Jerry Brereton dba Triad Systems."

(Record at 2-8;

152-153: [Affidavit of Jerry G. Brereton ("Brereton Affidavit")
at 1f1f 3-5 and attached exhibits].)
Brereton was able temporarily to mask his scheme through
payment of $30,000.00 to his employer.

His intentions to repay

the full sum before discovery were not realized, however, and
at the time his employer uncovered the scheme, there remained
an unrecovered loss of $36,000.00, which was ultimately paid by
Pacific Indemnity under employee fidelity coverage.

(Record at

2-8, 151-70; [Brereton Affidavit at 1[ 6].)
Pacific Indemnity brought this action as subrogee to Triad's
rights as the rightful owner of the converted instruments. The
lower court granted Pacific Indemnity's Motion for Summary
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Judgment against Bonneville Bank based on the ultimate liability
of appellant Bonneville Bank as the collecting bank.

(Record

at 283-293.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Between approximately December 5, 1980, and June 16,

1981, Jerry Brereton forged indorsement to at least ten
customer checks intended for Triad Systems Corporation and
.deposited those checks into his personal account at Bonneville
in Provo, Utah, under the name of "Jerry Brereton dba Triad
Systems," account no. 11-005139-9.

(Record at 152: [Brereton

Affidavit at 1f1f 3-5 and Exhibits thereto].)
2.

Of the checks involved, four were drawn upon and paid

to Bonneville by First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. ("First
Security") in amounts totalling $44,000.00.

(Record at 126-34,

152-70: [Brereton Affidavit at 1f 4 and Exhibits B-l, B-2, B-4
and B-8 attached thereto]; and [Affidavit of Joe F. Deniro at
inr 8, 12, 16 and 20] . )
3.

The remaining six checks were drawn upon and paid to

Bonneville by Zions First National Bank ("Zions") in amounts
totalling $22,000.00 (Record at 152-70: [Brereton Affidavit at
1f1f 4 and 5 and Exhibits B-3, B-5, B-6, B-7, B-9 and B-10
attached thereto].)
4.

The initial endorsement on all checks was made by

Jerry Brereton, who stamped "For deposit only Triad Systems
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11-005139-9" on the reverse side of each check before depositing it in his account at Bonneville (Record 153: [Brereton
Affidavit at 1f 5] . )
5.

Mr. Brereton had no authority from his employer to

deposit or otherwise negotiate customer checks.

(Record at

158-60: [Brereton Affidavit at Exhibit "A-2H].)
6.

On or about May 4 or 5, 1981, Mr. Brereton purchased

and sent to Triad Systems Corporation a cashier's check in the
amount of $20,000.00 purchased in the name of customer Five
Star Motor Supply and a separate cashier's check in the amount
of $10,000.00 purchased in the name of customer Number One
Performance.

(Record at 158-60: [Brereton Affidavit at Exhibit

"A-2"].)
7.

Triad Systems Corporation had no knowledge that

Mr. Brereton maintained a personal account under the name of
Triad Systems until approximately June, 1981.
158-60: [Brereton Affidavit at Exhibit
8.

(Record at

"h-2"].)

Triad Systems Corporation recovered the net embezzle-

ment loss caused by Mr. Brereton by collecting the same under
employee fidelity insurance coverage furnished by Pacific
Indemnity Company (Record at 153-54: [Brereton Affidavit at
1f 6].)
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9.

By subsequent payments directly to Triad Systems

Corporation, Mr. Brereton reduced the original debt to
$26,038.07.
10.

(Record at 154: [Brereton Affidavit at 1f 8].)

By motion for summary judgment dated April 8, 1987,

plaintiff sought recovery of the remaining loss from defendants
First Security and Zions, as drawee banks on the converted
checks.
11.

(Record at 171-82.)
First Security and Zions in turn successfully moved on

cross-claims against Bonneville for breach of express and
statutory warranties as the depositary and collecting bank on
Brereton*s account.
12.

(Record at 241-42.)

Pacific Indemnity's Motion for Summary Judgment

against Bonneville was granted based on the ultimate liability
of a collecting bank for collection of monies paid over a
forged endorsement.
13.

(Record at 241-43.)

Final judgment as to all the parties was entered on

June 24, 1987 by Judge Leonard H. Russon of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County.
241-243.)
14.

(Record at

See also Addendum "A."

On June 16, 1987, appellant Bonneville Bank filed a

Motion for New Hearing (Record at 244-45) and later, on July 6,
1987, filed a motion to amend its Answer to plead contributory
negligence against plaintiff.

(Record at 274-75, 329-31.)
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Appelli
17th,

. • ' — • : . . - .-> denied by Orders dated August 7th and

1987

15.

Record

: ^.83 -.•..>

See also A>i;:e:; i.\~ ""-l."

Bonneville also filed a tardy Motion * , Amend Judgment

on August .

^e^; . - • ?f ;.--

by Court Order dated September l/, i'iH/

he motion was denied
iRecuiii ,it r^i io.)

See Addendum "C."
16.

Appellant Bonneville bank t'le^i i.o notice of appeal

from the lower court's Judgment until September '*, I
than seventy days after entry of final judgment.
326.),

(Record at

See Addendum "D."
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The focus of Pacific Indemnity's response to Bonneville's
attempted appeal is upon the multiple and significant procedural defects which independently justify affirmance of the
summary judgment in favor of Pacific Indemnity as a matter of
law.
Bonneville has not established jurisdiction in this court
because of its failure to timely file required notice of
appeal.

Although the time for filing a notice of appeal may be

tolled under Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure through
timely filing of (1) a motion for new trial; or (2) a motion to
amend judgment, neither exception is applicable in the instant
appeal.

Neither a notice for new trial nor a timely motion to
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amend judgment was filed by Bonneville.

Hence Bonneville's

time for filing a notice of appeal elapsed on July 24, 1987,
more than forty days before Bonneville filed its tardy notice.
Likewise, Bonneville's Motion for Rehearing could not toll the
time for filing a notice of appeal because no such motion
exists under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
This Court should also assume the correctness of the
judgment below because Bonneville does not support any of its
contentions on appeal with citations to the record.

Further-

more, Bonneville's contentions on appeal were not raised in the
lower court until after entry of final judgment and thus should
not be considered by this court.
Finally, Bonneville has not raised any dispute as to any
material fact, except to the extent that it made an untimely
motion to amend its answer 12 days after entry of final judgment, which motion was denied.

Therefore, Pacific Indemnity

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Bonneville
is ultimately liable for checks paid over Jerry Brereton's
forged endorsement either indirectly based on breach of warranty of good title under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-207 (1953, as
amended), or directly based on a collection liability theory.
Cooper v. Union Bank, 507 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1973).
error below, the judgment should be affirmed.
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There being no

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BONNEVILLE FAILED TO ESTABLISH JURISDICTION
IN THIS COURT.
There is no question that appellate jurisdiction arises
only it

-'- '

appeal is filed within the time prescribed

by Rule 4(a), Rules of the Utah Supn^me >:,nutt:
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a
matter of right from the district court to the Supreme
Court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall
be filed with the clerk of the district court within
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from . . . .
In Barber v. Emporium Partnership, ih Utah ndv, f np

'i *

(Utah App. 1988) and Albretson v. Judd, 709 P.2d 347, 348 (Utah
1985), both of Utah's appellate courts confirmed that failure
to give notice of appeal within the time prescribed by law
leaves the appellate courts without jurisdiction.
Similarly, in Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d
1346 (Utah 1983), this Court stated,
The trial court therefore properly denied the motion
for a "rehearing." Furthermore, the time within which
defendant could have taken an appeal from the judgment
was not tolled. . . . The purpose of Rule 73 is to
make jurisdictional a failure to file a notice of
appeal on time. The merits of the judgment therefore
cannot be addressed on this appeal. (Citations
omitted.)
Armstrong, *. .

.

. See also Lord v. Lord, 709 P.2d

338 (Utah 1985).
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A.

Bonneville Failed To Timely File A Notice Of Appeal,
Leaving This Court Without Jurisdiction To Consider
The Lower Court's Summary Judgment.

In the instant case, Bonneville's docketing statement
(itself untimely) clearly shows that the final amended judgment
from which appellant now appeals was entered on June 24, 1987.
Appellant was required to file its notice of appeal within
thirty (30) days of that date or by July 24, 1987. Appellant
failed to file its notice of appeal until September 9, 1987, 77
days after the date of entry of final judgment.

(Record at

326.)
This Court has consistently dismissed appeals when a notice
of appeal has not been timely filed.

Since the Court similarly

lacks appellate jurisdiction in this case, a dismissal of
Bonneville's appeal is clearly appropriate.
B.

The Time For Filing Appellant's Notice Of Appeal Was
Not Extended For Any Reason.

Under appropriate circumstances, the time limit for filing
a notice of appeal may be tolled.

For example, under Rule 59,

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a timely motion to amend the
judgment may toll the 30 day notice of appeal requirement.
However, Rule 59(e) specifically provides a mandatory 10 day
limit on filing such a motion to amend.

Accordingly, the fact

that Bonneville did not file any appropriate motion within
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times prescribed by law clearly demonstrates that the time for
filing a notice of appeal ran without interruption from June
24, 198 7 to July 24

1 984

Thus, the time limits for filing o..:i:;:-

c

.-

appeal were not extended by any recognized post judgment
motions.

Although Bonnevilln u<i LIje a "Motion for New

Hearing" after the trial court's ruling, granting Pacific
Indemn:* .

M-•-;

tor Summary Judgment, that motion was

denied, and Judge Russon observed =\\ * ha+~ Mine,, consistent with
this Court's holdings, that no motion for "reconsideration" or
"rehear

« <-.-..;•

4

-r the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and

that such motions are improper

.M- : .

In prury v. Lunceford, 13 it an ; i "* ;

)
i t ~- 2d 662 (1966),

the plaintiff attempted to f:. > > motion for reconsideration in
order to set aside a judge's order granting a new trial.

In

response, this Court held that:
If the party ruled against were permitted to go beyond
the rules, make a motion for [reconsideration], and
persuade a judge to reverse himself, the question
arises, why should not the other party who he has now
ruled against be permitted to make a motion for
reconsideration, asking the court to again reverse
himself.
Id. at 663.

This Court stated that under such circumstances "a

judge could go on reversing himself periodically at the
entreaties of one or the other of the parties ad infinitum."
Id.

See also Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1980).
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Inherent in this court's condemnation of motions for
rehearing is the realization that allowing a motion for
rehearing would create "an unsatisfactory situation . . .

if a

judge could carry in his mind indefinitely a state of
uncertainty as to what the final resolution of the matter
should be."

Id.

Therefore, this court concluded:

In order to avoid a state of indecision for both the
judge and the parties, practical expediency demands
that there be some finality to the actions of the
court; and he should not be in the position of having
further duty of acting as a court of review upon his
own ruling.
Id. at 663-64.
This court's ruling in Drury was emphasized in Tracy v.
University of Utah Hospital, 619 P.2d 340 (Utah 1980).
Tracy the plaintiff filed a motion to intervene.

In

Hearing on

the motion was duly held and it was denied by the trial court
with prejudice.

Thereafter the plaintiff filed another motion

to intervene and styled it as a motion for "re-hearing."
at 342.

Id.

This Court declared that a motion for re-hearing or

reconsideration "may not be invoked to defeat the time limits
for appeal of a final order.

In any event, our rules of

procedure make no provision for such a motion. . . . "
342.

(Emphasis added.)

_Id. at

See also Retherford v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 739 P.2d 76, 80 (Utah App. 1987) (holding
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that period of Lime in fhi^h

appellate jurisdiction must be

established is unaffected by a motion for reconsideration.)
In the instant case, the appellant apparently contends that
it was entitled to a rehearing because (1) as a result of
"mistake" in assuming the Third Judicial District <_.-,• .

r

:

^t

Lake County operated under Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice,
It was inadequately prepare* : .r «

n respondent's

Motion r-r Summary Judgment; and . ^, oad appellant been a": v-o
to pt-i •: -

*. : .. . . • . opposing affidavit, it may have been

able to demonstrate a material issue ot inict. Neithp*

r,

f these

contentions justifies a rehearing and neither can toll * >- time
for giving notice of appeal to establish appellate jurisdiction.
There is no provision in the Rules of Civil Procedure, to
allow a court to reconsider or rehear a matter because a party
argues that it might have done something different in light of
the judgment ultimately entered.

Even if such a motion were

deemed to have been brought under Rule 60(b), it would not have
tolled the time for appeal.

Lord, 709 P.2d at 338, n. 1.

Appellant Bonneville's additional post judgment motions
similarly cannot extend the 30 day time limit for filing a
notice of appeal in violation of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Bonneville's tardy Motion to Amend Answer cannot

toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, especially where
the motion was filed after entry of final judgment.
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Moreover,

Bonneville fails to raise any issue as to the propriety of the
lower court's denial of the Motion to Amend Answer.
The Motion to Amend Judgment, similarly, was not a timely
motion for post judgment relief and did not otherwise toll or
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal from the June 24
Judgment.

Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly

provides that "a motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be
served not later than ten days after entry of the judgment."
(Emphasis added.)

In the instant case, appellant did not file

its Motion to Amend Judgment until August 20, 1987, more than
50 days after entry of judgment.

(Record at 330-31.)

Because

of its untimely filing, appellant's Motion to Amend could not
alter the mandatory time for filing a notice of appeal, which
had already elapsed on July 24, 1987.
Furthermore, appellant's motion was without authority under
the Rules of Civil Procedure because it impermissibly sought to
amend only the date of entry of judgment apparently for the
purpose of extending time to file a notice of appeal.

Even if

such a motion were allowed, appellant's motion falls far outside
the maximum period of time allowed by Rule 59(e).

See Hume v.

Small Claims Court of Murray City, 590 P.2d 309 (Utah 1979).
Thus, pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure and this
Court's decisions, Bonneville's attempts to manufacture an
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excuse to defeat the i .• :

r ime limits set for giving

notice of appeal from -* t ;iia judgment must be considered
inappropriate and unavailing.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE C O R R E C T N E S S OF
THE JUDGMENT BELOW BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED
TO REFER TO ANY PORTION OF THE RECORD THAT
FACTUALLY SUPPORTS TTS CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL,
This Court has consistently held that it will assume the
correctness oil the judgment below, where, as here, an appellant
does not support facts set forth in his or
tions to the Record.

^,

.-: * -

na-

Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d f -2. -. : i (Utah

1987) and State v. Tucker, - >" P ; i 755, 756-57 (Utah 1982).
In Trees, this Court declared that it:
will assume the correctness of the judgment below
where counsel on appeal does not comply with the
requirements of Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, as to making a concise statement of
facts and citation of the pages in the record where
they are supported. (Citations omitted.)1
In Trees, the fact statement in the appellant's Brief referred
to documents by their exhibit numbers, but contained no

1

Rule 24(a)(6), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, which
became effective in April 1987, ultimately replaced
former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 75(p)(2)(2)(d),
but did not alter the requirement that citations to
the record to support the fact statement in the
Briefs. See Trees, 738 P.2d at 613, n.3.
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citations to the Record.

Occasional references to the record

appeared in the Argument section of the Brief.

Trees, 738 P.2d

at 612, n.2.
Similarly, in State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah
1982), this Court concluded that:
A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of
the trial court is that the defendant failed to refer
to any portion of the record that factually supports
his contention on appeal.
In the instant case, and despite references to exhibits and
affidavits, Bonneville makes no reference whatsoever to the
Record to support any factual contentions.

Accordingly, this

Court should assume the correctness of the judgment below and
may affirm that judgment on this independent basis.
POINT III
BONNEVILLE'S IMPROPERLY RAISED CONTENTIONS
AND DEFENSES CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
This Court has forcefully and consistently held that it
will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.
Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1987); Topik v. Thurber,
739 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1987); Insley Manufacturing Corp. v.
Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986).
This Court has stated that the record must clearly show
that an issue was "timely presented to the trial court in a
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manner sufficient i.u obtain <i ruiing thereon.
that it was properly raised."

We cannot assume

Franklin Financial v. Empire

Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983)

If a party

fails to present an issue to the trial court, they will have
"waived the right to raise it" on appeal.

Utah County v.

Brown, 6 7 2 P 2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983).
In the present case, Pacific Indemnity's Motion for Summary
Judgment was served by mailing May 2b, 1987, and actually
receive^] by appellant: on May 28, '-8'. (Record at 288-93.)
Even Local Rule 2.8(b) (under wh;:;: Bonneville el aim- * > have
been operating), appellant was required to serve counter affidavits and any memorandum

'

*

motion within ten days or* X v/ . Sunday,

IcL

"* authorities opposing the
.\ Inne 8, .Junn I I.HWH a

See also Rule 3(i), Rules of Practice In the

Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah.

No such

statement, or counter affidavits were filed by Bonneville.
Pacific Indemnity's motion was heard on June 8, 1987 and
appellant appeared at the hearing through counsel.

Id.

Only after Pacific Indemnity's Motion for Summary Judgment
was granted by the court, did Bonneville react, filing (1) a
Motion for Rehearing dated June lh

UH'

( ,>) a Motion for

Leave to Amend Answer to the Complaint, dated July 6, 1987; and
(3) a Motion to Amend Judgment, dated Aug. 20, 19 87.
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The only argument raised on appeal by Appellant that was
even mentioned prior to this appeal relates to the attempted
Amended Answer, alleging contributory negligence.

However, the

Motion to Amend Answer was not even filed until after entry of
the final judgment, and was properly denied by the court.
Bonneville does not dispute the propriety of the lower court's
Order, denying the motion to amend.
It is obvious that the defenses raised and argued on appeal
by Bonneville were not presented to the trial court in a manner
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon because they were not even
raised until after final judgment was entered.

Accordingly,

the arguments and defenses raised by appellant relating to (1)
Utah Code Ann. § 3-419(3); (2) Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-406; (3)
contributory negligence; and (4) collection ratification, along
with cited cases and authorities cannot be considered by this
court for the first time on appeal.

Appellant did not raise

any of the above described contentions and defenses in its
Answer (Record at 17-19), or in its memorandum in opposition to
Pacific Indemnity's Motion For Summary Judgment, (Record at
142-46).

Indeed, Bonneville acknowledged ultimate liability

according to the "standard collection process."

Iji. at 143.

The first mention of any defense argued by appellant on appeal
was raised on either July 6, 1987 or later, which was at least
12 days after entry of final judgment in this matter.
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By

failing to timely present these arguments and defenses to the
lower court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon
Bonneville waived its right to raise them on appeal. Brown,
672 P.2d at 85.
POINT IV
APPELLANT BONNEVILLE BANK IS NEVERTHELESS
ULTIMATELY LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW, BASED
ON EITHER (1) STATUTORY LIABILITY OF THE
COLLECTING BANK RESULTING FROM WARRANTY OF
TITLE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-4-207; OR
(2) DIRECT COLLECTION RATIFICATION LIABILITY,
AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine
dispute as to a material fact and if the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Horgan v. Industrial Design

Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982).
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

See also Celotex Corp.

In the instant case, the

trial court granted Pacific Indemnity's Motion for Summary
Judgment, ruling that,
. . . Bonneville Bank was liable on the checks paid
over on Brereton's forged endorsements. The plaintiff
[Pacific Indemnity] alleges [in its supporting
memorandum] that 3-419(1)(c) does not pertain to
Bonneville Bank in this instance, since it is not a
representative of the type to which that section was
inteded to apply and, in any event Bonneville Bank
holds all proceeds on the instruments in trust and,
therefore, it is not entitled to a good faith
defense. The plaintiff [Pacific indemnity] cited
Goslin v. Awood, 283 N.W.2d 691, and Cooper v. Union,
507 P.2d 609.
* * *
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The Plaintiff's [Pacific Indemnity's] Motion was
granted for the reasons set forth in its Memorandum of
Points and Authorities and supporting Affidavits.
(Record at 290 and 292.)
Bonneville is ultimately liable to Pacific Indemnity either
indirectly as a result of its breach of statutory warranty of
good title under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-207 (1953 as amended)
or directly upon a theory of collection ratification.

In

either event, Bonneville is ultimately liable for the converted
checks paid over forged endorsements as a matter of law. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate because Bonneville has
not properly raised any genuine issue as to a material fact and
has in fact acknowledged ultimate liability of the "standard
collection process."
A.

(Record at 143.)

Bonneville Bank is Statutorily Liable to Pacific
Indemnity.

The "statutory approach" originally relied upon by Pacific
Indemnity in its pleading and initial motions against Zions and
First Security Bank follows a simple formula that finds the
drawee banks (Zions and First Security) strictly liable for
payment of checks over Brereton's forged endorsements under
Utah Code Ann. § 7QA-3-419(2) and, in turn, entitles the drawee
banks to pass the resulting loss or liability "upstream" to the
depository bank (appellant Bonneville) for breach of statutory
warranty of good title under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-207. As
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noted above, the statutory approach effectively passes strict
loss liability for checks paid over the forged endorsement,
through the drawee banks, to the collecting bank.
In Cooper v. Union Bank, 507 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1973), relied
upon by the lower court in this case, the California Supreme
Court recognized the statutory approach, holding that a drawee
bank is "in effect strictly liable to the true owner if it pays
an instrument on a forged endorsement . . . ."

The California

Court also recognized the traditional "general bank collection
theory" that "the true owner, in bringing an action against a
collecting bank for conversion of a check collected on the
forged endorsement, is deemed to have ratified the collection
of the proceeds from the payor bank."

_Id. at 614.

Thus, while recognizing the clear statutory rule, the
Cooper court questioned the necessity of such a route of
recovery and relied upon a theory of "collection ratification"
to hold the collecting depository bank directly liable to a
converted check's owner, without requiring the owner first to
proceed against the drawee banks.
n.6, and 617.

See Cooper, 507 P.2d at 615,

The Court justified the reasonableness of its

decision, as follows:
Because liability ultimately rests with the first
collecting bank, it is unlikely that such a bank was
intended to have a ready defense in a direct suit by
the true owner. Requiring cumbersome and uneconomical
circuity of action to achieve an identical result
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would obviously run contra the code's explicit underlying purposes to simplify, clarify and modernize the
law governing commercial transactions.
Id. at 617.
As discussed below, the end result under the "collection"
rule likewise justified the lower court's ruling that
Bonneville, as collecting bank, is ultimately responsible for
the plaintiff's loss, such liability in fact lies as a matter
of law, under any alternative theories of recovery.
B.

Bonneville Bank is Liable to Respondent on a
Direct Collection Theory.

The collection theory ultimately followed by the Cooper
court yields a practical rule of absolute liability for
appellant Bonneville as the collecting bank, though by a path
somewhat different than that mapped by the statutory language.

2

As stated in that case, "dominant precode law established
. . . that the proceeds were held, after collection by the
collecting bank, for the benefit of the true owner. Again
resorting to general banking theory, we find that the amounts a
collecting bank remits to a person who transfers to the bank a
check bearing a forged endorsement do not constitute the
proceeds of the instrument." Id. at 614. Further, the
"collecting bank must be deemed to retain the proceeds of the
instruments . . ., regardless of whether those instruments were
cashed or accepted for deposit." As similarly observed in
Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Company, 3 UCC Rep. 311, 319
(Pa. 1965), when [the collecting bank] purchased or cashed the
forged checks drawn on other banks it did so with its own money
and then, in putting them through for collection it obtained
from the drawee banks money which belongs to the plaintiff."
See Cooper, 507 P.2d at 616, n.12.
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It is apparent from consideration of the Cooper opinion
that the ratification theory is not a rule intended to absolve
drawee banks from liability to the true owner of a converted
instrument under 3-14(1) (c), or otherwise to deprive the owner
of its rights to recover the conversion laws.

The circumstances

of that case simply furnished the court a vehicle to promote a
direct right of action by the owner against the depository
bank, (a right not otherwise clear under the UCC).

The court

thus effectively shifted the conversion laws from the drawees
to the depository bank in furtherance of the uniformly recognized principal that "irrespective of the sequence of suits or
settlements, the law should normally come to rest upon the
first assaulted party [i.e. the first collecting bank] in the
stream after the one who forged the endorsement.

(Emphasis

added.) White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 581 (2d Ed.
1979).
In its Minute Entry ruling on plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment against Zions and First Security, the trial
court held that the Cooper decision was applicable in this
jurisdiction, and dismissed plaintiff's action against those
banks.

(Record at 203-05.)

If Cooper is to be followed so far

as to excuse the drawee banks from otherwise clear statutory
liability upon plaintiffs having named Bonneville Bank as a
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co-defendant in its Complaint, the reasoning should be followed
to its conclusion:

(1) that any "ratification" of Bonneville's

collections from Zions and First Security implied by the
structure of plaintiff's Complaint "does not constitute a
ratification of appellant Bonneville Bank's delivery of the
proceeds to the wrong person," [Cooper, 507 P.2d at 614]; (2)
that Bonneville thus retains the check proceeds collected from
both Zions and First Security in trust for respondent Pacific
Indemnity; and (3) that plaintiff has a clear right to recover
those funds upon judgment against Bonneville to the extent of
its principal loss, with appropriate pre-payment interest.

See

Aetna Casualty & Trust Co. v. Helper State Bank, 630 P.2d 721,
728-29 (Utah 1981).

This is the ultimate conclusion reached by

the trial court, and accords, in final result, with the weight
of authority that collecting banks are and should be directly
liable to a check's owner, for payment of the check over a
forged endorsement.
CONCLUSION
This Court may properly affirm the decision of the lower
court for numerous independent reasons.

First, Bonneville

failed to establish appellate jurisdiction with this Court
because it failed to timely file its Notice of Appeal.
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Second,

this Court should assume the correctness of the judgment below
because Bonneville failed to cite the Record to support facts
as required by Rule 24(a)(6), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
Third, appellant's attempt to raise contentions and defenses
for the first time on appeal, without raising such defenses in
the lower court, should not be considered.

Finally, appellant

Bonneville Bank is clearly liable to respondent Pacific
Indemnity Company (directly or indirectly) for payment of checks
over Brereton's forged endorsement, and there was no error in
the lower court's Summary Judgment.

This is true under clear,

uniformly recognized statutory language and likewise under the
separate "general theory of bank collection" pronounced by
California Supreme Court in Cooper v. Union Bank, in turn
adopted by this court in its earlier rulings in this case.
Upon these undisputed facts, respondent Pacific Indemnity
Company respectfully urges this court to affirm the trial
court's summary judgment against Bonneville Bank as a matter of
law.

In addition, because this appeal not only lacks any

reasonable or factual basis but also gives rise to fully independent and procedural grounds for affirmance, Pacific Indemnity
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Company respectfully requests that it be awarded appropriate
attorney's fees and costs.3
DATED this

day of March, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Larry R. Laycock
Attorneys for Respondent
Pacific Indemnity Company
SCMLRL116
3

Rule 33(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, provides that
"[i]f the court shall determine that . . . [an] appeal taken
under these Rules is frivolous . . . it shall award just damages
and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney's
fees, to the prevailing party." Under less egregious circumstances than those present in this case, the Utah Court of
Appeals has determined that an award of costs and attorney's
fees is appropriate under Rule 33. See Barber v. Emporium
Partnership, 76 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (February 12, 1988).
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
JERRY G. BRERETON, FIRST
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL
BANK and BONNEVILLE BANK,

Civil No. C82-7259
Judge Leonard H. Russon

>:: / / •

Defendants.

/'f-y'

.:-'' / ~v / v

/:>'

> 7

• / •/' / v ,

At hearing duly noticed before this Court on April 27,
1987, this Court considered plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment against defendants First Security Bank and Zions
Bank, as well as Motions by First Security Bank and Zions
Bank for partial summary judgment against defendant Bonneville
Bank.

David W. Slaughter appeared on behalf of the plaintiff,

Gifford W. Price appeared on behalf of Zions First National
Bank, Craig Carlile appeared on behalf of First Security Bank,
and Douglas A. Baxter appeared on behalf of Bonneville Bank.
At hearing, the Court also considered Motions made by First
Security Bank and Zions Bank to dismiss plaintiff's claims

A-l
—.*

,

•*"* ,• ^ ft

against them.
On June 8, 1987, the matter came up once again for hearing on plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against
Bonneville Bank.

The above-identified counsel also appeared

at that hearing on behalf of their respective clients.
The Court now having heard all arguments of counsel and
having reviewed the memoranda on file and good cause otherwise
appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

That plaintiff be and hereby is granted summary

judgment against Bonneville Bank in the amount of $26,038.07,
plus interest thereon at the legal rate of ten percent (10%)
per annum pre-judgment and twelve percent (12%) per annum from
the date hereof until paid; and,
2.

That plaintiff's actions against Zions First National

Bank and First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. be and hereby are
dismissed without prejudice; and,
3.

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. and Zions First

National Bank be and hereby are granted summary judgment against
Bonneville Bank for breach of actual and implied warranties
of presentment except that claims by these banks for attorney's
fees against Bonneville Hank are denied.
DATED this /--')

day of June, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

a«*k
D

-N -W ~C /

,
0«py(V Clerk

XE0D5ARD H. RUSSON/ D i s t r i c t CoLx\
---Judge
\
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH

)

ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Cynthia Northstrom, being first duly sworn, states:

That

she is employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau, attorneys for plaintiff herein; that she mailed a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment and Order (proposed) postage prepaid, first class mail, on the

Q^C day of

June, 1987, to:
Craig Carlile, Esq.
Hay, Quinney & Nebeker
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gifford W. Price, Esq.
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Allen K. Young, Esq,
101 East 200 South
Springville, Utah 84663

iPttUt*
thia

'ore me t h i s ^ r / )

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to

^M^2^u

Norttfistrom

day of May,

1987

My Commission Expires:

JL1>'<^ Jl&

/ V

//NOTARY PUBLIC
S7
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY,
a California corporation,

:

ORDER
I
CIVIL NO. C-82-7259

:
Plaintiff,
vs.
JERRY G. BRERETON, et al.,
Defendants.

On June 24, 1987 this Court entered an Amended Judgment and
Order wherein it granted the plaintiff Summary Judgment against
Bonneville Bank, granted
Security

Bank

plaintiff's
Security
breach

Orders

Complaint

Bank's
of

of

Zions First National Bank and First
Dismissal

against them,

Summary Judgment

warranty

of

endorsement, and breach

without
granted

Prejudice
Zions

to

First

against Bonneville Bank for

presentment,

breach

of

of contract, and denied

claims for attorney's fees.

and

as

guarantee

of

all parties

This Amended Judgment and Order

pertained to those motions which were heard on June 7, 1987.
Bonneville Bank moved for an order granting it a new hearing
in this matter on the grounds that its attorneys were unaware of
the

Local

Rules

for Third

District Court, thought they had

additional time in which to obtain affidavits, and alleging that
the case had been pending for several years, that an agreement

B-l

PACIFIC V. BRERETOH

ORDER

PAGE TWO

had been reached by all parties for the plaintiff to pursue only
defendant Brereton and, therefore, no discovery was undertaken
for those years, and that if Bonneville Bank had time, it could
have procured affidavits establishing questions of fact requiring
a trial.
Later, on July 6, 1987, Bonneville Bank moved to amend its
Answer to the Complaint to allege contributory negligence.
A review of this matter is in order.
The

Complaint

was

filed

on

September

8,

1982, wherein

plaintiff sued Brereton for fraud, Zions First National Bank for
conversion, First Security Bank for conversion, and Bonneville
Bank for "knowingly or negligently converting or aiding in the
conversion of property belonging to Triad Systems Corporation."
On

October

15,

1982

Bonneville

Bank

answered,

denying

charging allegations, and alleging the affirmative defenses of
estoppel and waiver wherein Triad gave Brereton direct or implied
authority to negotiate checks written to Triad Corporation.

It

did not plead contributory negligence or any other matters as
affirmative defenses.
On October 18, 1982 Zions Bank answered the Complaint, and
crossclaimed against Bonneville Bank.

Zions denied allegations

and alleged the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence,
estoppel, waiver or release, ratification, insufficient notice,
laches, 405 and 406 defenses, and lack of capacity or standing to
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warranty,

Crossclaim
and/or

ORDER

PAGE THREE

against

breach

of

Bonneville
indemnity,

alleged
and/or

breach

of

contributory

negligence.
On November
Crossclaim

4,

denying

1982

Bonneville

charging

Bank

replied

allegations,

but

to Zions1

alleging

no

affirmative defenses.
On December 13, 1982 a Default Judgment was taken against
defendant Brereton.
On July 16, 1986 First Security Bank answered the Complaint,
and crossclaimed against Bonneville.

The bank denied charging

allegations in the Complaint, alleged the affirmative defenses of
estoppel, authorization or ratification by Triad, 419(3) defenses
of good faith consistent with reasonable commercial standards,
laches, statute

of limitations, insufficient claim time, and

alleging plaintiff had actually received payment.

The Crossclaim

against Bonneville alleged similar allegations to those alleged
by Zions Bank.
On December 26, 1986 First Security Bank filed a Motion for
Partial

Summary

Judgment

against

Bonneville,

affidavit of Joe DeNiro in support thereof.

and

filed

an

First Security

alleged that Bonneville was the prior endorser, and thus liable
to First Security
guarantee

of prior

for breach of warranty of good title and
endorsement.

It alleged

each check was

endorsed by Brereton and presented to Bonneville for deposit in
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an account opened by Brereton entitled

"Triad Systems," that

Bonneville endorsed each check following Brereton1s endorsement,
that

Bonneville

guaranteed,"

that

endorsed

each

Bonneville

check

presented

"prior
the

endorsement

check

to

First

Security for payment, which was paid by First Security.
First Security argued that both endorsements warranted that
they had good title to each check, that Brereton's fraudulent
endorsement constituted failure of good title in both Brereton
and Bonneville Bank, and thus each breached warranty.

They also

argued that Bonneville Bank breached its guarantee of validity of
all prior endorsements.
On

February

18,

1987

attorney

for

Bonneville

Bank

acknowledged liability of Bonneville to First Security Bank, and
indicated a willingness to indemnify First Security, which First
Security rejected because it made claim to attorney's fees.
On

the

Opposition

same

to

date,

First

Bonneville

Security1s

filed

Motion

its

Memorandum

in

for Summary Judgment,

offering to sign indemnification agreement with said bank.
On April 9, 1987, the affidavit of defendant Brereton was
filed, wherein he admitted the fraudulent scheme, and stated that
Triad Corporation had no knowledge that he had paid towards the
Judgment, and that a balance was existing of $26,038.07.
On

the

same

date plaintiff

filed

a Motion

for Summary

Judgment against First Security Bank and Zions Bank, arguing that
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the said banks were strictly liable to the plaintiff in light of
Section 70A-3-419(1)(c) which provides that: "An instrument is
converted when it is paid on a forged endorsement."
On April 14, 1987 Zions Bank filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment against Bonneville, with a supporting Affidavit
of Donald Rocha, which indicated that the checks in question were
processed

on

the

basis

of

prior

endorsement

guarantees

by

Bonneville Bank.
On

April

23,

1987

Zions

filed

a

Motion

to

Dismiss

plaintiff's Complaint.
On the same date, Zions Bank filed a Motion in Opposition to
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that plaintiff's
recovery should be only against Bonneville Bank as the depository
or collecting bank which had begun the processing, and that
plaintiff's action

against

Zions was not well-founded.

The

foregoing was based upon the argument that by plaintiffs suing
both

Zions Bank

(drawee or payor bank) and

Bonneville Bank

(depository or collecting bank), the plaintiff had ratified the
payment of proceeds by Zions to Bonneville Bank.

Therefore,

there was no cause of action for conversion against Zions Bank.
The plaintiff did not sue Zions Bank for negligence.
theory against Zions Bank was on conversion.
Cooper v. Union Bank, 507 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1973).
B-5
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On

May

Decision

1,

1987

denied

this

the

Court

plaintiff's

ORDER

in

a

handwritten

Motion

for

Memorandum

Summary

Judgment

against Zions and First Security, indicating that the Cooper case
was

applicable, and granted

and

Zions

Bank

on

their

the Motions

Crossclaims,

of First
except

Security

as

to

Bank

attorney's

fees.
On

May

26,

1987

plaintiff

filed

a

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment against Bonneville Bank based upon the affidavits
by

Jerry

Brereton,

Joe

DeKiro

and

Donald

Rocha.

In

filed

support

thereof, plaintiff argued that following the Cooper case, if the
payor

banks

liability

(here,

because

Zions
of

and

First

ratification,

Bonneville's

collections

ratification

of Bonneville's delivery

Bonneville
banks

retained

in trust

from

payor

Security)
then

any

banks

did

were

free

of

ratification

of

not

constitute

a

to the wrong person, that

the check proceeds collected

from the payor

for the plaintiff, and plaintiff had

a right to

Judgments on those funds.
A Notice of Hearing of Summary Judgment was filed with the
Court

on

the

same

date, May

26, 1987, noticing

the matter

for

June 8, 1987 at 10:00 a.m.
On June 8, 1987, the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
against Bonneville Bank was heard.
for Bonneville

Bank.

Attorney Doug Baxter appeared

The other parties were represented.

The

Court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and again
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indicated that the Motions of the payor banks to dismiss were
granted without prejudice.

The claims for attorney's fees were

denied.
On June 16, 1987 the Court signed and entered the written
Judgment and Order granting plaintiff's Summary Judgment against
Bonneville

in

the

amount

of

$26,038.07,

plaintiff's claims without prejudice

and

dismissing

against Zions and First

Security, and granting the Motions of First Security and Zions
for Summary Judgment against Bonneville, which actually became
moot, inasmuch as they were dismissed from the lawsuit.
On the same date, June 16, 1987, Bonneville Bank filed a
Motion for a New Hearing, alleging that they had received the
Summary Judgment on May 29, 1987, that Bonneville's counsel were
unaware of the Third District's Local Rules, and thought Rule 2.8
applied, allowing them ten days in which to respond to the said
motion, that they had made a mistake, and had not had time to
prepare for the hearing with opposing affidavits, that there were
material issues of fact that could be raised by affidavits as to
a 3-419

defense of acting in good faith within commercially

reasonable standards in cashing the checks of Brereton.

This

motion was supported by an Affidavit of Roger Bjornson, wherein
he indicated the bank had no knowledge, and that they had acted
reasonably.
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26, 1987

the

plaintiff

filed

a Memorandum

in

Opposition to Bonneville Bank's Motion for New Hearing, taking
the position that mistake as to Rule 2-8 did not justify a new
hearing and that the Court could not grant a new trial per Rule
59, since no specific grounds were stated as required by that
rule, that there should be no allowance for simply "mistaken
assumptions," and, that in any case, there was no prejudice since
the Bjornson affidavit was not sufficient in law as required by
Rule 56, and even if it was, it was irrelevant since Bonneville
Bank was liable on the checks paid over on Breretonfs forged
endorsements.

The plaintiff alleges that 3-419(1)(c) does not

pertain to Bonneville Bank in this instance, since it is not a
representative of the type to which that section was intended to
apply and, in any event, Bonneville Bank holds all proceeds on
the instruments in trust and, therefore, it is not entitled to a
good faith defense.

The plaintiff cited Goslin v. Cawood, 283

N.W.2d 691, and Cooper v. Union, 507 P.2d 609.
On July

6, 1987 Bonneville Bank filed its Reply to the

plaintiff's Memorandum, pointing out that the Complaint had been
filed in 1982, that an agreement by all the parties was that
plaintiff

would

pursue

Brereton,

that

none

of

the

parties

undertook discovery during that interim period, that the Motion
for Summary Judgment was filed on May 26, 1987, and not received
by the bank until May 29, that the attorneys were unaware of the
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Third District Rule and were unprepared at the hearing, and that
under the Rules of Procedure should be granted a rehearing.
On July 6, 1987 Bonneville Bank filed a Motion to Amend its
Answer to plead contributory negligence against the plaintiff.
Defendant Bonneville Bank argues that it thought Rule 2.8 of
the Uniform Rules of Practice in District Courts was applicable
and, therefore, was not prepared

at the time of hearing on

plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

However, even allowing

plaintiff application of Rule 2.8, instead of the Third District
Local Rules, defendant did not comply with such rule.

Rule 2.8

requires a responding party in a Motion for Summary Judgment to
"file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of
the motion, a statement of answering points and authorities and
counter affidavits.M

Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice in the District

Courts of the State of Utah.

The said rule further provides that

"decisions shall be rendered without a hearing, unless requested
by the court, in which event the clerk shall set a date and time
for such hearing."

|

The plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was served by
mailing on May 26, 1987, and actually received by the defendant
on May 28, 1987. Under Rule 2.8 the said defendant was required
to serve counter affidavits and a statement of answering points
and authorities within ten days of May 28, or by June 7 (actually
June

8,

June

6 being

a

Sunday).

B-9
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countering affidavits were filed.

Therefore, there was nothing

for the plaintiff to reply to.
The matter was heard on June 8, 1987, and the said defendant
appeared through counsel.
It was only after the hearing on the said Motion for Summary
Judgment which was granted by the Court that plaintiff filed for
a new hearing, filed an affidavit, and filed a Motion for Leave
to Amend its Answer to the Complaint to plead the affirmative
defense of contributory negligence.
This matter has been pending since 1982, there have been
several hearings prior to plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
attended

by

all

parties, various

pleadings

indicate

clearly

issues as to negligence, the said defendant was put on timely
notice, and received a copy of plaintiff's Memorandum of Points
and Authorities.
There is no such motion as a motion for "reconsideration11 or
"rehearing."

Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P. 2d 1346

(Utah 1983); Peav v. Peav, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980).
Bonneville Bank's Motion for a New Hearing is denied.

The

plaintiff's Motion was granted for the reasons set forth in its
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and supporting affidavits.

B-10
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counsel

will

prepare

the

Order

Bonneville's Motion for Rehearing.
Dated this

day of August, 1987.

LEONARD H. RUSSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
I Ift'T
H DIXON MEDLEY
Ciert.
*-•/

Civ J'v C'err.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, to the following, this
day of August, 1987:

David W. Slaughter
Attorney for Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Clifford W. Price
Attorney for Defendant Zions
800 Kennecott Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Anthony W. Schofield
Craig Carlile
Attorneys for Defendant First Security
92 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
Allen K. Young
Attorney for Defendant Bonneville
101 East 200 South
Springville, Utah
84663

c rox
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY,
a California corporation,

RULING
CIVIL NO. C-82-7259

Plaintiff,
vs.
JERRY G. BRERETON, et al.,
Defendants.

Defendant Bonneville Bank has filed a Motion for Amendment
of Judgment and Objection to Order.

A Memorandum of Points and

Authorities has been filed in support thereof.
filed a Memorandum in Objection.

Plaintiff has

The matter has been submitted

to the Court for ruling without a hearing pursuant to Rule 3.
This Court granted plaintifffs Motion for Summary Judgment
on June

8, 1987.

Defendant received a copy of plaintiff's

proposed Order and Judgment on June 10, 1987. The defendant then
received an Amended proposed Judgment and Order on June 12, 1987.
This Court signed and entered the initial Judgment on June 16,
1987, and the Amended Judgment on June 24, 1987.
On June 16, 1987 defendant Bank filed a Motion for Rehearing
with a Memorandum in support thereof, and also an Objection to
the

proposed

Order.

(It

is assumed

that the Objection was

actually received by the clerk's office, but apparently misplaced
and actually dated filed on July 1, 1986.)
B-13
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proposed Amended Order was ever filed.

The Court signed the

Amended Order and entered the same on June 24, 1987.
On July 26, 1987 plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition
to defendant's Motion for a Rehearing.
On July 6, 1987 defendant filed a Reply to plaintiff's
Memorandum.

The Reply was dated June 30, 1987.

This Reply made

no mention of objections to either the initial proposed Judgment,
or the proposed Amended Judgment.
On July 16, 1987, defendant noticed up its Motion for New
Hearing and Objections to the Proposed Judgment and Order.
hearing on July 27, 1987 resulted in denial of the same.

A
The

Court entered its Order denying the said Motion on August 7,
1987.
As this Court ruled earlier, there is no such motion as a
Motion for New Hearing or Rehearing.

The Amended Judgment was

entered on June 24, 1987, twelve days after defendant received a
copy of the proposed Amended Judgment.

The effective date of the

Amended Judgment herein is June 24, 1987.

Orders on plaintifffs

subsequent Motions bear their own effective dates.

Plaintiff's

Motion to Amend the Judgment is denied.
Dated this / /

day of September, 1987.

^ ^
ID H. RUSSON^
DISTRICT COUIJST3TBG2'- *
a DIXON H a ^
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following, this,
day of September, 1987:

A. Dennis Norton
David W. Slaughter
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Anthony W. Schofield
Craig Carlile
Attorneys for Defendant First Security
400 Deseret Bldg.
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Gifford W. Price
Attorney for Defendant Zions
800 Kennecott Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Allen K. Young
Attorney for Defendant Bonneville Bank
101 East 200 South
Springville, Utah 84663

c*? X z9s6<ynM<^

B-15

FILED IN

zizrxzor?'-*

Sal? L r ' T Or::-•••.'.

U;-:-i-

AUG ID -By

~\'<^U\\dX«*Ur

DAVID W. SLAUGHTER (A2977)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs .
JERRY G. BRERETON, FIRST
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, ]SL A. ,
ZIONK FIRST NATIONAL BANK and
BONNEVILLE BANK,

Civil No. -€^?-^25-9—
Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendants.

Defendant Bonneville Bank's Motion for Rehearing and
separate Motion for Leave To Amend Its Complaint in the
entitled action came on regularly for hearing before the
entitled court on Monday, July 27, 1987, the Honorable
Leonard H. Russon, presiding.

Defendant, Bonneville Bank

appeared through its counsel, Allen K. Young; Plaintiff
Pacific Indemnity Company appeared through its counsel,
David W. Slaughter.
C-l

The Court has heard and considered all argument of
both parties, and has separately reviewed and considered the
Memoranda offered by the parties in support of their respective
positions.
The Court thus being fully advised in the premises
and for good cause appearing, and upon its own decision and
Order dated August 7, 1987, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Bonneville Bank's
Motion for Rehearing on the Summary Judgment entered against
it on June 16, 1987, in favor of Plaintiff, be and hereby is
denied;
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that
Defendant Bonneville Bank's Motion to Amend its Answer be
and hereby is denied.
DATED this

day of August, 19 87.
BY THE COURT

ft

«y- - . *

^

.N

^

H. 1>.A«J«<V H U V C L E : Y

By >-\v ^rV >i cfM.-LAuLs''
~
~
'TiJ^c'jr"~

!

•,

Leonard H. Russon
Third District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, with the U.S.
Postal Service, to the following this //
C-2-

day of August, 1987:

Allen K. Young
101 East 200 South
Springville, Utah 84663
and to
Craig Carlisle
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
92 North University Avenue
#210
Provo, Utah 84 601
and to
Gifford W. Price
Callister, Nebeker & Duncan
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Case No. C83-7259

'AIMLL

v

^
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY,
a California corporation,

RULING
CIVIL NO. C-82-7259

Plaintiff,
vs.
JERRY G. BRERETON, et al.,
Defendants.

Defendant Bonneville Bank has filed a Motion for Amendment
of Judgment and Objection to Order.

A Memorandum of Points and

Authorities has been filed in support thereof.
filed a Memorandum in Objection.

Plaintiff has

The matter has been submitted

to the Court for ruling without a hearing pursuant to Rule 3.
This Court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
on June

8, 19S7.

Defendant received

a copy of plaintiff's

proposed Order and Judgment on June 10, 1987.

The defendant then

received an Amended proposed Judgment and Order on June 12, 1987.
This Court signed and entered the initial Judgment on June 16,
1987, and the Amended Judgment on June 24, 1987.
On June 16, 1987 defendant Bank filed a Motion for Rehearing
with a Memorandum in support thereof, and also an Objection to
the

proposed

Order.

(It

is

assumed

that

the

Objection was

actually received by the clerk's office, but apparently misplaced
and actually dated filed on July 1, 1986.)

D-l

No Objection to the
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proposed Amended Order was ever filed.

The Court signed the

Amended Order and entered the same on June 24, 1987.
On July 26, 1987 plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition
to defendant's Motion for a Rehearing.
On July
Memorandum,

6, 1987 defendant filed a Reply to plaintiff's
The Reply was dated June 30, 1987.

This Reply made

no mention of objections to either the initial proposed Judgment,
or the proposed Amended Judgment.
On July 16, 1987, defendant noticed up its Motion for New
Hearing and Objections to the Proposed Judgment and Order.
hearing on July 27, 1987 resulted in denial of the same.

A
The

Court entered its Order denying the said Motion on August 7,
1987.
As this Court ruled earlier, there is no such motion as a
Motion for New Hearing or Rehearing.

The Amended Judgment was

entered on June 24, 1987, twelve days after defendant received a
copy of the proposed Amended Judgment.

The effective date of the

Amended Judgment herein is June 24, 1987.

Orders on plaintiff's

subsequent Motions bear their own effective dates.

Plaintiff's

Motion to Amend the Judgrpent^s denied.
Dated this / /

day of September, 1987.

D H. RUSSON
DISTRICT COUI^TJlJUGE * _
D-2

°^

By

m^

r \ f » * *» '
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following, this,
day of September, 1987:

A. Dennis Norton
David W. Slaughter
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Anthony W. Schofield
Craig Carlile
Attorneys for Defendant First Security
400 Deseret Bldg.
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Gifford W. Price
Attorney for Defendant Zions
800 Kennecott Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Allen K. Young
Attorney for Defendant Bonneville Bank
101 East 200 South
Springville, Utah 84663

c*? ^ eQ>U/nd&t>L*j>
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ALLEN K. YOUNG (A3583)
YOUNG & KESTER
Anomevs for Defendant J. F. Ollivier
101 East 200 South
Sprimmlle, Utah 84663
Telephone: 489-3294
^ n

u
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
- 1
STATE OF UTAH

•0'
/

—oooOooo--

PACIFIC INDEMNITY CO.,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

JERRY G. BRERETON, et. al.,

Civil No. C82-7259
Judse Leonard H. Russon

Defendants.
-oooOooo--

TO THE PLAINTIFF AND ITS ATTORNEY, DAVID W. SLAUGHTER:
Notice is hereby given that defendant Bonneville Bank hereby appeals to the Coun
of Appeals for the State of Utah from the summary judgmerit entered in this action by the
District Coun lor the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on
the 24th day of June, 1987, and from the subsequent denial of defendant's request for a
new hearing and objections to the proposed order entered on August 19,1987.
DATED this 3 c4 day of September, 1987.

ALLEN K^Y(
Attorney for Defendant J. F. Ollivier
E-l

x

t \ • * * \ r*

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this
SI

day of September, 1987, to the following:
David W. Slaughter, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Craig Carlile, Esq.
Ray, Quinney &. Nebeker
400Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Gifford W. Price, Esq.
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake Citv, UT 84133

%\s^xi^^\
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E-2
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CERITIFCATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that on the 18th day of
March, 1988, I caused

four (4) true and correct copies

of the Brief of Respondent Pacific Indemnity Company
to be served upon the following:
Allen K. Young
Attorney for Defendant Bonneville Bank
101 East 200 South
Springville, Utah 84663

